Morocco Invades Spain

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

In today’s edition, we have to shift our geographical focus to what is, perhaps, the biggest geopolitical crisis since Iran. Because, yes, the Moroccan invasion of Ceuta is a form of hybrid warfare, not a humanitarian crisis. Over 50,000 Moroccans invaded a city of only 80,000 inhabitants. Not only is this unsustainable, but it also gives the word “replacement” a tone that goes from conspiracy theory to palpable reality. What is happening in Spain is not a refugee crisis; it is a deliberate and coordinated attack on Spain, and it should be called exactly that. Nothing less.

Although Morocco’s Crown is clearly the villain in this story, much of this was made possible by Pedro Sánchez’s negligent border policy, which has left Spain defenseless against these types of actions. And it’s not the first—nor will it be the last—time this happens. This is precisely how Morocco occupied and took control of Western Sahara. History is repeating itself, and media outlets are focusing their attention on a false humanitarian narrative. Make no mistake, that is not the case, and our job is to bring you the best analysis while staying truthful.

Migration remains a hot topic, not only in Europe. Haiti is the protagonist of the other side of the coin, and the challenge to the cancellation of its U.S. Temporary Protected Status proves it. Today’s analysis on the matter is brought to you by a new analyst who is making his GCaM debut. Make him feel welcome through the feedback you give us. We welcome him as we say goodbye to our former analyst. Winds of change are coming, but stay tuned, because better things are ahead.

In this issue, you will find:

• The Moroccan Invasion of Spain: Another Episode of Geopolitical Extortion

• Haiti Loses TPS Privileges: The Redefinition of Asylum-Seeking

As always, please feel free to share GCaM with your friends and colleagues. We all, at the GCaM team, wish you a good weekend.

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The sudden invasion of more than 50,000 people into Ceuta through the Moroccan border is being framed by many as a humanitarian emergency. However, viewed through the lens of history, it resembles something far more familiar: another episode in Morocco’s long-standing strategy of using migration as an instrument of geopolitical coercion. The real crisis is not humanitarian—it is one of sovereignty.

In perspective. The events that unfolded in Ceuta over the last few days are unprecedented in scale but not in nature. At least 50,000 migrants crossed into Spanish territory—through Ceuta, a city with a population of only 80,000—in less than 48 hours, overwhelming local authorities and triggering one of the largest border crises in modern Spanish history. Such a movement cannot be understood solely through the language of migration. It immediately became a geopolitical event. For decades, Rabat has maintained that Ceuta and Melilla constitute “Spanish-administered Moroccan territories,” despite the historical reality that both cities belonged to the Spanish Crown centuries before the modern Moroccan state came into existence.

• Whenever bilateral relations deteriorate, migration has repeatedly emerged as one of Morocco’s preferred instruments of pressure. More than 50,000 people crossed into Ceuta within days, overwhelming Spanish border infrastructure and forcing an emergency military and police response.

• The episode follows a historical pattern in which Morocco has repeatedly relaxed border controls and orchestrated movements of multitudes during moments of diplomatic tension with Madrid.

• Rather than a conventional migration crisis, the episode represents another test of Spain’s capacity to defend its sovereignty under external coercion.

How it works. Migration has become one of the most effective instruments of twenty-first-century statecraft. Unlike conventional military pressure, it carries plausible deniability while imposing immediate political, economic and humanitarian costs on the targeted state. Morocco has employed variations of this strategy before. Similar dynamics were visible during the 2021 Ceuta crisis and, decades earlier, during periods of confrontation surrounding Western Sahara. Civilian populations become instruments through which governments increase pressure without crossing the threshold of conventional military confrontation. Back in the 50s, the Moroccan crowd mobilized their army amongst civilians to the Wst Sahara, effictively invading and taking control of the territory, later carrying genocidal practices against the sahawis.

• According to reports from Spain’s CNI, Moroccan media have been disseminating false reports claiming that Spanish authorities welcome migrants with flotation devices and assistance once they reach Spanish waters, encouraging additional crossings.

• Border management becomes a geopolitical lever capable of extracting diplomatic concessions without firing a single shot. Human flows generate immediate political crises inside democratic societies while preserving ambiguity regarding state responsibility.

• The migrants themselves become the principal victims of a broader geopolitical contest in which they function as instruments rather than beneficiaries.

Between the lines. The timing of the crisis is unlikely to be accidental. Recent efforts by Pedro Sánchez to rebuild relations with Algeria—Morocco’s principal regional rival—have introduced new tensions into Madrid’s already fragile relationship with Rabat. At the same time, Sánchez arrives at this confrontation with diminished international leverage. His government’s foreign policy has generated friction with several traditional partners, reducing Madrid’s diplomatic room for maneuver precisely when external support has become most necessary. The U.S. and Israel still resent Sánchez's decision to not support their war efforts in Iran, and EU countries blame their national security being vulnerable on the Spanish government's inept border policies.

• The result is a Spain that finds itself increasingly isolated while confronting one of the most effective coercive tools available to its southern neighbor. Spain’s diplomatic balancing between Algeria and Morocco has become increasingly difficult amid broader regional rivalries.

• The Sánchez government enters this crisis after years of controversial foreign-policy decisions that have weakened its capacity to mobilize international backing.

• Morocco appears to understand that pressure is most effective when its counterpart lacks strong external support.

Why it matters. What occurred in Ceuta extends far beyond Spain. If migration can successfully be employed to obtain political concessions from a European state, the precedent reaches the entire continent. These unmeasured flows threaten every single aspect of the culture of Western civilization, importing the third world into Europe. If Morocco succeeds in invading and taking control over Ceuta and Melilla, the Islamic world will control the chokepoint that is the Strait of Gibraltar, being able to isolate the European Mediterranean from the world. For Europe, the lesson is uncomfortable: border security has become an issue of national security.

• Weaponized migration increasingly joins energy, cyberattacks and economic coercion as a central instrument of hybrid statecraft.

• Spain’s response will shape how future coercive episodes are interpreted by both allies and adversaries.

• The inability to impose meaningful costs on states that employ migration as leverage risks normalizing the tactic across other geopolitical theaters.

In conclusion. Ceuta should not be remembered simply as another migration crisis. It represents another chapter in a long-running geopolitical contest in which Morocco has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to transform population movements into diplomatic leverage. Pedro Sánchez’s slow and reactive management of the crisis—as well as his whole migration policy since he's been in power—has exposed the strategic costs of a foreign policy that has left Spain with fewer allies precisely when it needed them most.

• Yet the broader lesson extends beyond any single government. History suggests that whenever migration becomes a tool of coercion rather than a spontaneous social phenomenon, the debate is no longer about immigration. It is about sovereignty.

• And if Europe fails to recognize that distinction, Ceuta may prove not to be an isolated episode, but a preview of a new era in Mediterranean geopolitics: just like it happened in Rome in 476.

This week, nearly 350,000 Haitian migrants in the United States lost their Temporary Protected Status (TPS) after a ruling by the Supreme Court last month. Now migrants will have to choose between staying in the U.S. and risking deportation or returning or willingly return to one of the most dangerous countries in the world.

In perspective. TPS is granted by the U.S. Government to individuals whose country is going through armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or any sort of disaster that would prevent people from safely returning to and living in their home country. For Haitians, this protection was granted after the devastating 2010 earthquake and again in 2021, after the start of the Haitian Crisis, a couple of months after the murder of Haitian president Jovenel Moïse.

• The Trump administration moved to end TPS for Haiti and Syria, arguing that the status was never meant to be a permanent immigration solution and that conditions in both countries had improved enough to justify its termination.

• A lengthy legal battle followed. In Mullin v. Doe, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the Secretary of Homeland Security's TPS determinations are not subject to judicial review—effectively giving the administration free rein to end designations whenever it chooses.

• The ruling strips protections for more than 350,000 Haitians and around 6,000 Syrians. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has said that they will amp up operations to arrest and deport Haitian migrants. Most of these crackdowns will happen in Florida, the state with the highest Haitian population

Between the lines. Most Haitian TPS holders arrived during the Biden administration after the death of Jovenel Moïse. Since his death, Haiti's political, economic, and social order has spiraled into what many have described as a “failed state.” So, what can migrants expect when they arrive in the country?

• The country has not held elections since 2016, and its parliament has been inactive since 2019. A transitional government took over after Moïse's death and has nominally planned elections for this year, though years of institutional collapse make that timeline fragile at best.

• The country’s capital, Port-au-Prince, is primarily controlled by gangs who hold an estimated 90% of the city. The government has made efforts to combat the presence of criminal groups, but they have largely been unsuccessful. While most of the gang’s control has been limited to the capital, they are starting to expand their territory into more rural areas.

• The World Bank estimates that around 66% of the country lives on USD 3.65 per day, a figure driven down further by gangs that impose extortion fees on basic goods. Around 5.7 million Haitians are facing food insecurity.

Why it matters. The termination of TPS for Haitians could mark a turning point in U.S. migration policy toward the Caribbean. Rather than expanding humanitarian protections indefinitely, Washington appears increasingly willing to treat temporary protection as exactly that—temporary. The Supreme Court’s ruling also reinforces the executive branch’s authority to determine when humanitarian designations should end, giving future administrations greater flexibility to tighten immigration policy.

• For countries across the hemisphere, this signals that the United States is likely to prioritize border enforcement and controlled legal migration over broad humanitarian admissions.

• That shift may discourage future irregular migration if potential migrants conclude that temporary protections are less likely to become long-term residency.

• At the same time, it places greater pressure on countries of origin to address the conditions driving emigration, rather than relying on migration as a safety valve for domestic instability.

In conclusion. The end of TPS for hundreds of thousands of Haitians reflects a broader recalibration of U.S. migration policy. As Washington places greater emphasis on border security and the temporary nature of humanitarian protections, governments throughout the hemisphere may need to adjust to a regional environment where migration is increasingly managed through deterrence rather than expanded legal protections.

• Whether this approach ultimately reduces irregular migration or simply shifts migration pressures elsewhere will depend largely on whether fragile states such as Haiti can restore a minimum level of security and governance.

• Until then, migration is likely to remain one of the defining geopolitical challenges in the Americas.