War In Iran: Is The Ayatollah Dead?

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

We apologize for the delay; some things happening in the Middle East called for some last-minute changes in today’s newsletter.

Only a week ago, we were warning about possible war in the Middle East. Tanker deployment along the Mediterranean made it clear Trump meant business with deterrence towards nuclear negotiations with Iran. Today, joint operations between the U.S. and Israel struck major strategic points in Iran, including the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s compound. Israel’s Channel 12 assessed he did not survive, but there is no confirmation.

For those who presume nothing ever happens, today is a hard pill to swallow, but in the end, escalations seem pretty safe. Only military targets have been struck—both by the U.S. and Israel as well as Iran—and no major world power has threatened to defend Iran. Two scenarios emerge: either Iran gives up their nuclear program or the regime will be overthrown. At least, that is how we see it, but these predictions don’t often age well.

One thing’s for sure: so far, we have been right about Trump’s course of action both on Venezuela and Iran. We will, as always, continue to monitor the situation and report back next week.

In this issue, you will find:

• What We Know Is Happening in Iran, So Far

• China Advances Their Nuclear Submarine Efforts

• SCOTUS Ruling: Old Doctrines, New Market Risk

As always, please feel free to share GCaM with your friends and colleagues. We all, at the GCaM team, wish you a good weekend.

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Only a day ago, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was chanting “Death to the U.S., death to Trump.” Today, Iran has been struck, and it is unsure if the Supreme Leader survived. The escalation is real.  

In perspective. In the early hours of Saturday, February 28, the U.S. launched major joint combat operations in Iran, together with Israel. While Israel targeted Iranian regime leaders, the U.S. aimed to take out Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. While it hasn’t been confirmed, Israel has assessed that the Ayatollah was killed in the attacks. That remains uncertain, but The New York Times provided visual confirmation of his compound after it was struck, showing that little remained beyond a few trees..

• As of now, we can confirm the operation included strikes in Tehran—including near senior leadership offices, as well as missile and defense infrastructure—, and other air raid explosions were reported in cities such as Qom, Isfahan, Karaj and Kermanshah.

• Some of the targeted sites include military infrastructure, as well as a fortified compound associated with senior regime leadership. The joint offensive has been popularly named “Operation Lion's Roar.”

• Iran’s retaliation has included multiple missile and drone strikes on U.S. military bases, including Bahrain’s Fifth Fleet base, Al Udeid in Qatar, Kuwait’s Al Salem Air Base, and Al Dhafra in the UAE. Missile launches have triggered alerts in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and Israel’s Iron Dome has been working overtime fighting off incoming Iranian missiles.

Between the lines. Behind all this, as we reported last week, were the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S. Trump knew, from the very first minute, that strikes were on the table if Iran did not meet his demands to abandon their nuclear program. Tankers had been deployed around the Middle East since the start of the negotiations, which indicated escalation was imminent. Now, the president has taken the message a step further, urging Iranians to “take over your government” once the strikes are over, announcing that “the hour of your freedom is at hand.”

• His message resonated among allies, as Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain said that British planes “are in the sky today” in the Middle East. Starmer added that Iran should give up its (nuclear) program, refrain from further strikes, and end repression of its people, stating that “This is the route back to the negotiating table.”

• So far, the Ayatollah has not appeared publicly, but his Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, has. The official response is willingness to talk.

• Araghchi stated that Iran is interested in de-escalation and willing to talk if the joint operations are halted. He has claimed, however, that regime change was “mission impossible,” although he has not been able to confirm whether the Ayatollah survived the attacks.

Global echoes. As the situation unfolds, the United Nations Security Council has called a meeting for later today. In a Telegram statement, Russia’s Foreign Ministry condemned the attack on Iran as an “unprovoked act of armed aggression.” China, on the other hand, has called for de-escalation, stating they are highly concerned with the situation.

• Similar statements have been made by the Brazilian government, as well as Spain and Pakistan. Oman, which had been involved in mediating the nuclear negotiations, made a public appeal to end the fighting to avoid severe regional consequences.

• While many U.S. rivals have condemned the attacks, none have committed to defending Iran. This gives the U.S. a strategic advantage: its enemies will not engage in retaliatory actions. Their scope of response seems to be, so far, limited to speech.

Trouble at home. As expected, Democratic leadership is not standing by the president on these operations. Sen. Andy Kim (D-N.J.) called on Congress to return to vote on a war powers resolution to either authorize or, more likely, rebuke today’s actions in Iran. In his words, Congress has to reassemble as soon as possible to “show this is not something that the American people want.” Meanwhile, Iranians in the streets of Tehran are chanting and celebrating the joint operations, similar to what happened after Maduro’s capture.

• On the conservative side, former Defense Secretary Mark Esper claimed Trump “made the right call”, but also supported the idea that the president should brief Congress and approach the American people through it.

• Like the Venezuela situation showed, polarization in government will make it impossible for Democrats to stand behind the president, while most Republicans will defend the move.

Yes, but. Concerns, however, have risen. While Trump won a lot of support with ending the war in Gaza, some analysts have noted that the U.S. government’s foreign policy in the Middle East still seems to respond solely to Israel’s interests. While Israel stands to benefit from the situation, Iran is a regional threat to all U.S. allies in the Middle East.

• As it stands, the Iranian regime is still the biggest threat to stability in the Middle East, remaining the biggest global terrorist sponsor, not only in Asia, but in the Western Hemisphere as well.

• Iranian-backed organizations like Hezbollah have a growing presence in the American continent, including formal networks in Venezuela and Argentina.

• Regime change has proven tricky in the past, but with growing popular support for overthrowing the Ayatollah domestically, the situation stands to benefit both Israel and the U.S., as well as every other country in the Middle East.

The bottom line. If the current strike–retaliation cycle continues along the trajectory being reported, the next few days will likely be defined by calibrated escalation. Total war seems far from reality, which reinforces how unmatched U.S. hegemony remains, despite claims to the contrary. Limited but symbolically powerful Iranian responses, continued Israeli and possibly U.S. follow-on strikes to reinforce deterrence, and intense diplomatic traffic aimed at preventing a regional spillover that could threaten Gulf shipping lanes and energy markets are on the table for the coming days.

• Markets, airspace restrictions, and naval posture in the Persian Gulf will be early indicators of whether this stabilizes or widens.

• As for regime change, sudden collapse remains unlikely in the short term; the Iranian system is built around the Revolutionary Guard and layered succession mechanisms that prioritize continuity under pressure. External strikes can weaken, fracture, or radicalize a regime, but they do not automatically produce a political transition.

• Whether regime collapse occurs will depend on momentum and how internal unrest coincides with sustained external pressure in a way that overwhelms elite cohesion.

The United States maintains an operational fleet of 71 nuclear-powered submarines. China now fields 32. Russia stands at 29. The United Kingdom and France trail with 10 and 9 respectively, while India operates 2.

In perspective. At first glance, American dominance appears intact. The U.S. still commands more than double China’s nuclear-powered fleet. But the more important story lies in trajectory, not totals. Submarines are the backbone of credible maritime deterrence. They provide second-strike capability, sea denial, power projection, and intelligence gathering in contested waters. Unlike surface fleets, nuclear submarines operate with stealth, endurance, and strategic ambiguity. They are the quiet insurance policy behind global influence.

• China’s 32 boats represent a deliberate shift from coastal defense to blue-water capability.

• Beijing is not merely defending the South China Sea anymore, but preparing to contest open oceans.

• Nuclear propulsion removes the operational tether of diesel-electric limitations and allows sustained presence deep into the Pacific and potentially beyond.

Why it matters. The U.S. retains qualitative superiority in experience, global basing, and integration with allied fleets. However, numbers matter when geography compresses reaction time. In a Taiwan contingency or a broader Western Pacific conflict, proximity favors China. A fleet of 32 submarines operating near home waters forces the U.S. to stretch its own 71 across multiple theaters—Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic, and Middle East.

• Russia’s 29 vessels complicate the picture. Though Moscow’s economic strain limits sustained naval modernization, its undersea fleet remains potent.

• The convergence of 32 Chinese and 29 Russian nuclear submarines—whether coordinated or merely simultaneous—alters the risk calculus for Washington.

• This is not the Cold War’s bipolar simplicity. It is a multipolar undersea competition, and the U.S. bloc faces strong contestants.

What it means. The United States still leads, but dominance is shifting. In the 1990s and early 2000s, American naval hegemony faced no peer. Today, it faces a rising peer and a stubborn secondary challenger. Submarines are a leading indicator of strategic patience. They take years to design, construct, and commission. China’s current fleet reflects decisions made a decade ago. What matters is not today’s 32, but what Beijing is building for 2030.

• There is also a quiet linkage to the broader instability unfolding in the Middle East.

• If tensions with Iran escalate, U.S. submarines become even more central—shadowing adversaries, securing sea lanes, deterring regional escalation.

• But every submarine committed to the Gulf is one not positioned in the Indo-Pacific. Global commitments strain finite assets.

The bottom line. World dominance is not lost in a single moment. It erodes through diffusion of capability. The United States still possesses the world’s most capable undersea fleet. Yet China’s advance signals a transition from American naval supremacy to strategic dispute; and contestation favors the patient.

The evolution of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) doctrine is profoundly reshaping the federal balance of power, carrying significant implications for global markets. By intervening in the scope of the administrative state, the Court is fundamentally altering how trade and regulatory policies are implemented.

• This structural shift transitions authority from unilateral executive actions to congressional oversight, injecting a new dynamic of legislative uncertainty into the economic landscape.

In perspective. The historical context reveals a deliberate reshaping of federal authority.

• The executive branch’s operation has been heavily marked by a structural dismantling of administrative state capacities in order to pursue presidential power consolidation.

• During Trump’s first and second terms, the SCOTUS continuously sided with the executive on matters of centralizing power, excluding agencies, and limiting lower courts from interfering with executive actions.

• Rulings such as Trump v. CASA allowed the executive to enact aggressive, immediate policies, while opposition litigation remained fragmented and moved slowly through judicial system channels.

The SCOTUS doctrine. A significant judicial pivot is currently underway through the revival of specific legal frameworks.

• The recent anti-administration crusade relies on reviving dormant legal theories, specifically the nondelegation doctrine and the Major Questions Doctrine.

• The nondelegation doctrine posits that Congress cannot constitutionally transfer its legislative authority to executive agencies, whereas the Major Questions Doctrine dictates that agencies must have clear and explicit congressional authorization before enacting regulations of profound economic or political significance.

• Consequently, cases like FCC v. Consumers’ Research, which argue that agencies have been granted congressional powers, will probably be ruled unconstitutional, as Congress may be perceived as having improperly delegated its taxing and regulatory powers.

The executive overexpansion. The Court has specifically targeted the unilateral imposition of trade barriers.

• The 6–3 decision in Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump understands tariffs as, essentially, a tax decision. Thus, the Court, according to the aforementioned doctrines, limited the delegation of congressional taxation powers to the Executive.

• Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch reasoned that the executive overextended its reach. Their ruling states that tariffs are fundamentally a tax; hence, Congress must validate the order before implementation.

• Conversely, Justices Kavanaugh, Thomas, and Alito dissented, arguing that tariffs relate to national security and foreign affairs and warning of disastrous economic effects from the reversal.

Power rebalancing. The legislative branch is being forced to reclaim its historical prerogatives.

• Since the Cold War, through acts like the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the Trade Act of 1974, and IEEPA, Congress has delegated executive decision-making power on trade.

• This securitization of trade was a constant decision driven by ongoing national security concerns, especially against Soviet blocs and China.

• Nonetheless, the current scenario points toward a SCOTUS rebalancing of power, likely due to the belief that executive expansions threaten republican checks and balances, thereby ensuring geoeconomic mechanisms pass through Congress instead of remaining unilateral.

Why it matters. The ruling immediately alters the mechanics and speed of federal policymaking.

• While unilateral restrictions on trade are still possible from the Executive, specific measures like tariffs must now pass through Congress.

• The SCOTUS has reduced short-term market risk by enforcing time-dependent processes, requiring the Executive to present investigations and participate in public hearings.

• Consequently, Congress faces elevated accountability and risk, as it must now directly confront the Executive, particularly in late July, when Section 122 — the current global tariff policy — needs to be submitted to a vote.

Hemispheric shockwaves. The structural shift introduces massive supply chain and regional market uncertainties.

• There is a high risk of macro-regional impacts in the short run, although Mexico and Canada have been granted exemptions on agricultural products, energy, and minerals.

• The broader region, particularly nations outside the USMCA framework, faces significant risk due to supply chain uncertainty and the need to adjust to margin compressions in less than 150 days, and afterward, to remanage risk given Congress’s decision.

• Nonetheless, implementing new tariffs will be highly complicated, as Congress is deeply divided. Republicans do not vote as a unified bloc, and Democrats usually vote against this type of policy. There are low chances that both chambers will vote in favor of Trump’s policies given the current distribution.

In conclusion. The Supreme Court’s intervention decisively curbs the era of instantaneous, unilateral executive trade policies, fundamentally altering the market’s risk profile. While mandating congressional approval reduces the likelihood of sudden tariff shocks, it simultaneously exposes markets to the gridlock and unpredictability of a deeply divided legislature.

• Moving forward, international markets and regional supply chains will have to navigate a complex, time-dependent legislative process rather than reacting to immediate executive orders.