The U.S. Is Done Waiting

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

This week’s edition tracks a hemisphere tightening under pressure, from Caracas to Havana. In Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez’s proposed amnesty is the clearest test yet of whether the proxy presidency is a real transition mechanism or a temporary stabilization play while the regime’s hardliners remain intact.

We also unpack the strategic ripple effects of START’s expiration, as the world slides into a looser nuclear order defined by autonomy, thresholds, and middle-power ambition. Finally, in What We’re Watching, China publicly backs Cuba against “external interference,” while Haiti’s latest spiral underscores how governance vacuums keep widening across the Greater Caribbean.

In this issue, you will find:

• Delcy Rodríguez Tests Venezuela’s Proxy Transition

• Nuclear Arms Race: Risk and Scenarios

• A New Nuclear Order: Brazil’s Regional Hegemony in the Atlantic

• What We’re Watching

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Delcy Rodríguez’s proposed amnesty is the first systemic move aimed at converting Maduro’s removal into something more than a symbolic decapitation. 

In perspective. It is an attempt to turn force into governance. The National Assembly has advanced the initiative, but the text has not yet been fully published, and human rights organizations are already pressing for clarity on scope, exclusions, and enforcement. That tension is not accidental. Amnesty can either function as a bridge toward de-escalation and political reintegration, or as a controlled valve designed to buy time, legitimacy, and compliance without dismantling the underlying power structures.

• Seen through that lens, the amnesty tells us a great deal about how the proxy presidency is operating. 

Between the lines. Rodríguez is signaling simultaneously to three audiences. To Washington, she is offering tangible steps that fit neatly into the U.S. narrative of “stabilization and reconciliation” following the intervention: prisoner releases, reduced repression, and the promise of a softer political climate without immediate rupture. To Venezuelans, the language of forgiveness and coexistence seeks to cool revenge instincts at a moment when the state remains staffed by the same bureaucratic and security networks. 

• And to chavista insiders, the message is more transactional. Reports that the amnesty would exclude crimes such as murder, drug trafficking, and serious human rights violations are not merely legal caveats.

• Instead, they draw a survival line. Mid-level officials and technocrats may have a future if they cooperate. 

• Those tied to the most toxic abuses do not.

Why it matters. This logic aligns closely with U.S. interests. A gradual, compliant unwinding of the regime is far easier to manage than a sudden collapse. Washington does not need a moral victory; it needs a functioning state, a security apparatus that can be redirected, and an opposition that can be reinserted without triggering a purge spiral or civil conflict. Amnesty becomes a sequencing tool. 

• First, de-escalate and reduce pressure. Then, renegotiate power relations.

• Only later does the question of elections arise, and on terms Washington believes it can manage.

• The speed with which the bill is being advanced, paired with the opacity around its final wording, suggests that momentum is being prioritized over broad consensus.

Yes, but. The danger, however, is obvious. No transition can truly advance while figures like Diosdado Cabello remain intact as veto players. Early reporting after Maduro’s capture made clear that while the top of the pyramid was removed, much of the coercive machinery remained in place. Cabello’s continued presence at the center of the ruling party and his links to security factions mean that amnesty, by itself, does not neutralize the regime’s hard core. A selectively enforced amnesty can be used to discipline rivals, shield loyalists, and repackage continuity as renewal.

• This is why the amnesty should be read less as an endpoint than as a stress test. Its credibility will depend on how it is implemented, not how it is announced. If the final text is published quickly and applied broadly, it signals a willingness to trade real power for stability.

• If it remains vague, discretionary, or selectively enforced, it becomes little more than a bargaining chip. The exclusions will matter even more than the inclusions.

• A law that claims to bar perpetrators of major abuses but quietly carves out exceptions in practice would entrench impunity under a softer name.

Better watch out. Equally important is what happens beyond the legal framework. Prisoner releases mean little if surveillance, intimidation, and informal coercion continue. The proxy presidency only works if Rodríguez can discipline the security state rather than merely speak over it. 

• Early signs of elite exits, quiet resignations, or negotiated off-ramps would strengthen the case that a controlled dismantling of chavismo is underway. 

• Entrenchment, public defiance, or selective crackdowns would point in the opposite direction.

In conclusion. In short, the amnesty is the clearest evidence so far that Rodríguez intends to comply with the transition logic designed in Washington and to trade cooperation for survival. But compliance is not the same as control. As long as figures like Cabello retain coercive capacity, the risk remains that reconciliation stalls, reverses, or mutates into managed impunity. 

• The next phase will determine whether Venezuela is actually exiting the regime, or merely learning how to live under it with a different face.

The expiration of the START treaty on February 5, 2026, marks the definitive end of the bipolar nuclear era.

In perspective. As the world transitions toward a fragmented new nuclear order, the traditional hierarchies of deterrence are being replaced by a complex cartesian plane of strategic autonomy and operational readiness. This shift is characterized by the rise of middle powers and the erosion of the old safeguards that prevented a global arms race. The structural foundations of nuclear stability collapsed with the end of the Cold War's final oversight mechanism.

• The START treaty functioned as a stabilizer by limiting the quantity of ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-carried warheads while allowing for intrusive on-site and aerial inspections between the US and Russia.

• This arrangement was mutually beneficial: it allowed a financially constrained Russia to avoid a race it couldn't afford, while the U.S. maintained global stability without diverting excessive resources to military escalation.

• Currently, Russia pushed to extend the treaty for 12 months, but the US has declined it with the intent of including China in a new treaty.

Between the lines. The core of the current crisis lies in the transition from a bipolar balance to an unstable tri-polar competition involving China. The United States is desperate to avoid a simultaneous arms race against both Moscow and Beijing, specifically fearing the mobilization of China’s massive industrial and engineering capacity toward nuclear expansion.

• China would refuse to participate in any treaty that would cap its potential, viewing nuclear expansion as a prerequisite for becoming a world hegemon and securing regional control over Taiwan and Japan.

• Russia's primary incentive to stall is purely economic. The war with Ukraine is depleting its financial capacity for a nuclear arms race, leading Moscow to seek a treaty extension until its economy recuperates.

How it works. The Cartesian map serves as a diagnostic tool to visualize where nations stand in the shift from institutional alignment to independent lethality. The x-axis measures the spectrum between aligned/dependent powers – who act as an extension of another nation's nuclear policy (European states or Pakistan's dependence on China) – and autonomous actors capable of unilateral sovereign action.

• The y-axis tracks readiness from latent or threshold capabilities—i.e., the technical capacity to weaponize civil nuclear energy—to active or readiness, defined by the volume of deployed bombs across land, air, and sea.

• Movement from left to right represents the reduction of dependence on nuclear policy towards independence to strike or respond instantly to threats.

• Movement from bottom to the top represents the transition from early stages of nuclear technique towards full capability of usage.

India. Tactical realities in the Himalayas and the subcontinent have rendered New Delhi’s traditional doctrine obsolete.

• The border conflict of May 2025 demonstrated that Pakistan’s integration of advanced Chinese hardware—such as drones and missiles—requires a more aggressive Indian stance.

• India has realized its No First Use policy is unsustainable if China and Pakistan coordinate a dual-front attack, specifically if China strikes the Himalayas while Pakistan threatens tactical nuclear use in the south.

• India should be pivoting toward a First Strike counterforce doctrine.

Turkey. Ankara is watching carefully NATO’s infrastructure creases to carve out a path toward strategic autonomy without the need for immediate domestic production. The precedent of the 2016 coup attempt—where the US lost momentary control of its nuclear bombs—was a key precedent.

• The Turkish leadership understands that physical control over the 50 B61 bombs at Incirlik base is a powerful bargaining chip.

• By investing heavily in civil nuclear energy with Russian assistance, Turkey is building the necessary infrastructure for a future breakout or to use American assets as hostages to negotiate its status as a great power.

Japan and South Korea. Washington may be considering the unthinkable: outsourcing nuclear deterrence to its Asian allies to contain a rising China. The US National Defense Strategy of 2026 signaled a shift by removing explicit language on denuclearization and transferring primary deterrence responsibilities to other countries.

• This outsourcing of nuclear deterrence allows the U.S. to create a regional ring of fire around China, ensuring containment without directly risking the American mainland in a first-tier exchanges.

• This is especially true given the rapid militarization of Japan under a new government.

In conclusion. The new nuclear order is defined by uncertainty and the decentralization of ultimate power. As the tripolar reality takes hold, the world must navigate a landscape where middle powers may no longer rely solely on superpower protection but more on their own sovereign action.

• This shift represents a critical systemic risk where the old rules of engagement no longer apply, and the margin for nuclear policy has been stretched.

The termination of the START Treaty signifies more than a diplomatic failure; it marks the definitive end of global nuclear stability and the dawn of a new era of uncertainty.

In perspective. As the rigid structures of the 20th century dissolve, the world is transitioning from a bipolar hierarchy to a complex landscape in which middle powers redefine their roles through technological autonomy. Brazil stands at the forefront of this shift, leveraging decades-long nuclear ambitions to elevate its position on the world stage. This evolution not only alters regional power dynamics but also challenges the traditional gatekeepers of global security. The historical framework of the 20th century was defined by a binary struggle that confined global power projection to two principal actors.

• The logic of the Cold War was dictated by an unrelenting nuclear arms race and the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which functioned as the primary deterrent against direct confrontation.

• During this period, the United States and the Soviet Union acted as the only true vectors of global power projection, capable of shaping geopolitical outcomes across every continent.

• The international system operated as a fully bipolar order, with most conflicts managed through proxy wars that preserved the core stability of both superpowers.

The unipolar mirage. The collapse of the Soviet Union briefly suggested a world unified under a single hegemon before giving way to a far more fragmented reality. The fall of the USSR ushered in a temporary unipolar moment in which the United States sought to integrate the global system through economic frameworks such as the WTO.

• The rise of China and the emergence of influential middle powers soon introduced a set of risks that the post-Cold War order was structurally unprepared to manage.

• This transition produced a geoeconomic world in which the traditional military-industrial complex must coexist with decentralized value-chain threats and regional ambitions that increasingly challenge U.S. dominance.

The quest for autonomy. Brazil’s pursuit of nuclear propulsion represents the culmination of a strategic trajectory rooted in the refusal to accept externally imposed technological limits.

• Confronted with strict barriers to technology transfer from established nuclear powers, Brazil initiated a clandestine nuclear program as early as 1979 to secure defense autonomy.

• A critical diplomatic breakthrough came in 2008, when Brazil signed a treaty with France for submarine development that included naval construction technology while explicitly excluding nuclear secrets.

• Today, the development of the Álvaro Alberto submarine is nearing completion, marking Brazil’s mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle for naval propulsion, even if financial constraints continue to slow progress.

The nuclear advantage. Nuclear-powered submarines constitute a qualitative leap in military capability that fundamentally alters the long-term balance of power in the region.

• Conventional submarines are tethered to the surface to recharge batteries, a vulnerability that exposes them to modern radar and satellite detection.

• By contrast, the Álvaro Alberto eliminates the need for resurfacing, allowing it to remain submerged and undetected for months.

• While diesel-electric submarines can sustain high speeds only briefly, a nuclear-powered vessel can traverse the Atlantic at full speed without interruption, dramatically extending the operational reach of the Brazilian Navy.

The realist risk. The sudden acquisition of superior military technology inevitably generates threat perceptions among neighboring states. The Álvaro Alberto and its successors will possess the capacity to overwhelm any other maritime force in Latin America, effectively ending the era of regional military parity.

• Because no other state in the region can reliably detect a nuclear submarine, neighboring countries face profound strategic uncertainty, unable to monitor Brazilian movements even within their own maritime zones.

• This imbalance compels both regional and extra-regional actors to engage Brazil from a structurally weaker position, as Brasília moves toward becoming the de facto guardian of the South Atlantic.

In conclusion. Brazil has moved beyond regional competition and positioned itself for a permanent role at the highest levels of international geopolitics. Operating a nuclear-powered submarine without possessing nuclear weapons places the country in a unique legal and strategic space shaped by the unraveling of the old nuclear order.

• As the self-designated guardian of the South Atlantic, Brazil increasingly obliges external powers to negotiate directly with Brasília on military and diplomatic terms.

• Ultimately, this technological achievement reinforces Brazil’s long-standing claim for a permanent seat at any future global security council.

What We’re Watching 🔎 . . .

China backs Cuba against 'external interference' as foreign minister visits Beijing [link]

Reuters

China publicly backed Cuba against what it called “external interference” during a high-level visit by Havana’s foreign minister to Beijing, signaling Beijing’s intent to politically shield the island as U.S. pressure intensifies. The statement comes as Venezuela’s collapse has cut off a key economic lifeline for Cuba and as Washington tightens its posture across the Caribbean.

While China lacks the capacity to replace Venezuelan oil flows at scale, its diplomatic support serves a strategic purpose: complicating U.S. efforts to isolate Havana and signaling that Cuba remains embedded in a broader anti-U.S. alignment. The message is less about aid and more about deterrence.

U.S. backs Haiti’s prime minister as presidential transitional council’s mandate ends [link]

Jacqueline Charles, Miami Herald

Haiti’s crisis continues to deepen as armed gangs tighten control over Port-au-Prince, further eroding any remaining state authority. According to reporting, criminal groups now dominate key infrastructure, disrupt humanitarian access, and effectively dictate daily life in large parts of the capital. International efforts remain stalled: the Kenya-led security mission faces delays, funding gaps, and political uncertainty, while the Haitian government lacks both legitimacy and capacity to restore order.

The situation underscores a broader pattern in the Caribbean and Central America: low state capacity creates power vacuums rapidly filled by organized violence. For Washington, Haiti remains a destabilizing risk with few viable tools left short of direct intervention or sustained external security administration.