Russia and Ukraine Turn Latino

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

Here's something we haven't talked about in a while: Ukraine. The tables have turned since that day that Trump told Zelenski he didn't have the cards in the Oval Office. Now, the Gulf countries are turning to Ukraine to purchase their anti-drone technology, while the U.S. is struggling to keep them on their good side with Iran. Things are complicated in Washington, and Ukraine is in the spotlight again. But today we will talk about the war from a perspective few are talking about: Latin American soldiers. The continent is quietly becoming central for the fight, and you will read about this more with a piece from our team that deserves your undivided attention.

In this issue, you will find:

• Costs of the War: The Mercenary Pipeline and Regional Security Risks

• Investment Dynamics in Global Oil

As always, please feel free to share GCaM with your friends and colleagues. We all, at the GCaM team, wish you a good weekend.

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As the Russo-Ukrainian war enters its fifth year, the conflict has spiraled into a grueling war of attrition in which the demographic and material limits of both nations are being pushed to their breaking point. The political costs of sustaining this prolonged war effort have scaled exponentially, forcing Moscow and Kyiv to navigate increasingly volatile domestic realities and structural fatigue.

• To circumvent the internal political hazards and structural limitations of domestic mass mobilization, both sides are actively looking abroad, increasingly targeting Latin America as a fertile recruiting ground to replenish their depleted frontlines.

In perspective. In Ukraine, the geopolitical reliance on the United States has undergone a quiet shift toward a more European-centric support model, while the state struggles with a diminished coercive capacity to enforce conscription. Simultaneously, while the Kremlin has achieved a more profound autocratic consolidation under Putin, it remains highly cautious of the domestic fallout associated with mass mobilization within an economy heavily constrained by Western sanctions. Overall, the internal architectures of both belligerents are showing profound signs of strain, creating a domestic environment in which complicated traditional conscription drives the demand for foreign fighters.

• The demands of total war in Kyiv have triggered a severe democratic backslide characterized by the concentration of executive power, which has marginalized parliamentary oversight as the government prioritizes immediate survival and resource redirection.

• In parallel, the country faces a critical manpower gap, where pervasive war weariness and the state’s low coercive capacity have hindered domestic recruitment, forcing the armed forces to rely on international legionnaires and foreign recruitment pipelines.

• On the other hand, Moscow’s recruitment strategy is explicitly designed to shield the urban Russian middle class from the direct human costs of the front, opting instead to leverage high financial incentives and fraudulent conscription to attract economically vulnerable recruits from the Global South – specifically Latin America – to offset its own domestic economic insecurity.

How it works. The logistical pipelines sustaining this foreign influx reveal a highly transactional theater in which economic disparities in Latin America are leveraged to supply frontline combat power. Ukraine’s International Legion offers an economic lifeline that exponentially eclipses domestic wages, specifically targeting battle-hardened veterans from asymmetrical conflicts. In tandem, Russia has outsourced part of its manpower deficit to state-adjacent networks in Cuba and Colombia, drawing economically desperate recruits into a high-casualty combat environment in which life expectancy is drastically compressed.

• The Ukrainian Armed Forces attract highly trained Colombian veterans – prized for their decades of experience in heterodox anti-guerrilla warfare – by offering frontline combat pay ranging from USD 3,000 to USD 5,000 a month.

• Moscow relies heavily on a pipeline of Cuban nationals, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating up to 15,000 recruits drawn by USD 2,000 monthly contracts – a scheme Havana formally denies – while simultaneously expanding its reach to recruit vulnerable Colombians.

• Survival metrics for these volunteers highlight the extreme volatility of their deployment. Intelligence data suggests an average survival time of merely 150 days upon reaching the battlefield, with nearly half of foreign combat fatalities occurring within the first four months.

Between the lines. Beyond the immediate tactical utility, the presence of Latin American combatants introduces long-term geopolitical risks and unintended security externalities for their home countries. Many governments in the region have begun to distance themselves from these private conscription efforts to avoid formal geopolitical positioning in a war that remains polarizing. However, the true danger lies in the veteran-to-military market, where the specialized skills acquired on a high-intensity modern battlefield could eventually migrate back into domestic criminal or parapolitical structures.

• The return of veterans from the Ukrainian front carries the risk of technological and tactical knowledge transfer – including drone warfare and electronic signals intelligence – into Latin American criminal networks already deeply intertwined with military circles.

• A deeper integration is forming between Russian and Cuban security apparatuses, creating a pool of Spanish-speaking, regime-compatible personnel with frontline exposure who can circulate through allied security environments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba.

• By allowing or failing to stop these flows, Latin American states risk the emergence of a mercenary class that views military skill as a mobile, fluid asset, potentially destabilizing regional security balances through private or state-sponsored gray-zone operations.

In conclusion. The outsourcing of the Russo-Ukrainian war to Latin American veterans transforms a regional territorial dispute into a globalized extraction of human capital. As long as structural inequality and stagnant labor markets plague the Global South, the battlefields of Eastern Europe will find a steady supply of men willing to trade high-risk military labor for economic survival.

• Ultimately, this dynamic warns of a dangerous precedent in which the political costs of war are exported, leaving Latin American societies to eventually manage the violent leakage of a conflict thousands of miles away.

For decades, the dominant assumption in Washington was that Asia’s economic integration with China would coexist with a durable strategic dependence on the United States. The logic seemed simple: Beijing could be the region’s factory, but America would remain its ultimate security guarantor. That balance is now eroding.

• A new ASEAN survey illustrates just how quickly the regional mood is shifting. In 2023, 61.1% of respondents across Southeast Asia said they would align with the United States if forced to choose between Washington and Beijing. One year later, that number fell sharply to 49.5%. China, meanwhile, climbed from 38.9% to 50.5%, overtaking the US as the preferred strategic partner overall.

• The most striking aspect of the data is not simply that China leads. It is where the changes are happening. Malaysia and Indonesia, two of the most important Muslim-majority economies in the region, overwhelmingly favor China. Laos remains firmly in Beijing’s orbit.

• Thailand, historically one of America’s oldest regional partners, now slightly tilts toward China as well. Even countries still strongly aligned with Washington, such as Singapore and the Philippines, increasingly frame their position less as ideological loyalty and more as strategic necessity.

In perspective. This shift is not happening because Southeast Asia suddenly trusts China more than the United States. In fact, many ASEAN states still view Beijing as the region’s primary long-term threat, especially in maritime disputes, economic coercion, and territorial expansion in the South China Sea. The drift toward China is happening because geography, trade, and perceptions of American inconsistency are beginning to outweigh fear.

• China is simply too economically central to ignore. It is the largest trading partner for nearly every country in Southeast Asia. Supply chains, industrial production, tourism flows, infrastructure financing, and energy imports are increasingly tied to the Chinese economy. For ASEAN governments, strategic alignment is no longer determined exclusively by military calculations, but by economic survivability.

• The Belt and Road Initiative accelerated this dynamic. Ports, railways, industrial parks, and digital infrastructure financed by Beijing have woven Southeast Asia into a Chinese-centered economic architecture. Even governments wary of Chinese influence often find themselves structurally dependent on continued Chinese growth.

• At the same time, the United States increasingly appears distant, distracted, and unpredictable.

Between the lines. Southeast Asia watched the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. It watched Washington struggle to sustain political consensus over Ukraine. It is now watching the strain generated by simultaneous crises involving Iran, the Red Sea, and Taiwan. The lesson many Asian governments are drawing is not necessarily that America is weak, but that America is overstretched.

• This matters enormously in Asia because credibility is the currency of deterrence. For countries living next to China, the question is brutally pragmatic: if a crisis erupts, will the United States truly absorb the economic and military costs required to defend the region over the long term? Increasingly, many policymakers are not fully convinced.

• The problem for Washington is that containment strategies require permanence. China does not need to defeat the United States militarily across Southeast Asia. It simply needs regional elites to conclude that accommodating Beijing is safer than depending on an external power whose political cycles constantly redefine foreign policy priorities.

• That perception has deepened under repeated American strategic oscillations. One administration pushes economic decoupling. Another attempts selective re-engagement. Security commitments remain rhetorically strong, but economic integration efforts lag behind. Meanwhile, China offers what many regional governments value most: continuity.

Yes, but. That does not mean ASEAN wants Chinese domination. Quite the opposite. Southeast Asia’s preferred strategy has historically been balancing, not submission. The region wants American military presence precisely because it fears becoming trapped inside a Sino-centric order. But balancing only works if both poles appear stable and durable.

• Today, many ASEAN states see a United States increasingly consumed by domestic polarization, election cycles, and simultaneous global crises.

• China, despite its own structural economic problems, still appears geographically permanent, economically unavoidable, and strategically patient.

Why it matters. The danger for Washington is that these numbers may represent the beginning of a psychological turning point rather than a temporary fluctuation. Once regional actors begin internalizing the idea that China is the inevitable center of gravity in Asia, strategic behavior changes rapidly.

• Foreign policy in Southeast Asia is deeply transactional. Countries rarely align based on ideological affinity alone. They align based on expectations about future power distribution.

• If regional elites conclude that China will dominate Asia’s economic and security architecture over the next two decades, many will gradually reposition themselves accordingly, even while publicly maintaining neutrality.

• That creates a paradox for the United States. The more Washington frames China as the defining existential challenge of the century, the more Asian governments may seek to avoid becoming frontline participants in that confrontation.

In conclusion. Asia is not necessarily becoming pro-China. It is becoming less convinced that America can sustainably remain the organizing power of the Pacific. That distinction matters.

• The ASEAN survey reflects a region adapting to what it increasingly sees as the realities of geography and long-term power concentration. China is nearby, economically indispensable, and politically persistent.

• The United States remains militarily dominant, but increasingly perceived as distracted and strategically stretched across too many theaters at once.

• For Washington, the challenge is no longer simply containing China militarily. It is convincing Asia that American power still has the endurance, focus, and economic depth required to remain the region’s preferred long-term partner.