Keiko Turned it Around... Finally

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

It seems like the fourth time's a charm. At least it is for Keiko Fujimori, who is projected to win the Peruvian elections. The big question, if she ends up winning, is what she can make of her presidency, given around half the country still sees her as highly unpopular and her country lately has a tradition of, well, shredding presidents while still in office. She will have, however, something her predecessors lacked: a stronger legislative support. How long it will last remains to be seen.

On another note, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is here, in our beloved continent, and while this is not a sports newsletter, do expect some World Cup-related content. In the end, in this day and age, it is undeniable that FIFA means politics and business. It is, in the end, likely the biggest diplomatic vehicle on Earth. He who rules FIFA has a gateway to diplomacy everywhere in the world, something that is useful for many states. We will talk more about this in the near future. For now, enjoy the beautiful game.

In this issue, you will find:

• Peru's Narrow Turn: What Keiko Fujimori's Comeback Really Means

• The Geopolitics of World Cup Demographics

• Fertilizer crisis and Brazil’s Agricultural Shock

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Keiko turned it around, and everything indicates that, at last, she will be president. Fourth time's a charm.

In perspective. When we last analyzed Peru's runoff election, Roberto Sánchez held a narrow lead, and much of the international press was already treating him as the country's next president. At the time, however, we argued that the margin was simply too small to support such certainty. Sánchez's advantage amounted to only a few thousand votes nationwide, and two factors suggested caution: the overseas vote had not yet been fully counted, and the geographic distribution of the remaining ballots strongly favored Keiko Fujimori. That is precisely what happened; the current count is at 98.32% complete, and it shows Fujimori with 50.012% and Sánchez with 49.988%. The difference is only 4,308 votes out of more than 18 million.

• As votes from abroad continued to arrive, Fujimori gradually erased Sánchez's lead and moved ahead. The Peruvian diaspora once again proved decisive, but the foreign vote alone does not explain the comeback.

• Lima and parts of the Amazon region also played a critical role in tipping the balance.

• Together, they reveal something important about the political coalition that may ultimately return Fujimori to power.

How it works. The territorial map of the runoff resembles two different countries voting in parallel. Sánchez performed strongly across much of the Andean interior, particularly in regions where anti-establishment sentiment remains deeply rooted and where distrust toward Lima's political and economic elites runs high. Fujimori, meanwhile, dominated the capital, much of the coast, and significant portions of the Amazon. That coalition matters, because Lima alone accounts for roughly a third of Peru's electorate. No candidate can realistically win the presidency while losing the capital by a large margin.

• Fujimori not only carried Lima but did so with enough strength to offset Sánchez's dominance in many rural regions. The Amazonian vote reinforced that advantage, helping her compensate for losses in the southern Andes.

• The result highlights a political divide that has defined Peru for years. On one side stands a more urban, economically integrated Peru tied to formal markets and institutional stability. On the other stands a more rural and peripheral Peru that continues to view the political system with profound skepticism.

• The runoff did not resolve that divide. If anything, it confirmed how deeply entrenched it remains.

Why it matters. The other major lesson is that Keiko Fujimori's political ceiling remains very real. This is now the fourth time she has reached the decisive stage of a presidential election. In 2011, 2016, and 2021, she lost despite entering the runoff with substantial political machinery and strong territorial bases. The reason was always the same: Fujimori is exceptionally effective at mobilizing supporters, but she is equally effective at mobilizing opponents, and that dynamic has not disappeared.

• The fact that Sánchez, a candidate with significant ideological baggage and a platform that generated concern among investors and moderates alike, was able to keep the race effectively tied illustrates the enduring strength of anti-fujimorismo.

• Even if Fujimori ultimately prevails, she will do so while facing the reality that roughly half the country actively opposed her candidacy, which will shape the next administration from day one.

Between the lines. The election result may determine who occupies the presidential palace, but it does not solve Peru's underlying problem: governability. The country's political system remains one of the most fragmented in Latin America. Even though Fuijimori holds the majority legislative coalition, Congress is divided among numerous parties with weak institutional identities and limited incentives for long-term cooperation. Presidents routinely enter office without reliable legislative majorities. Congress, meanwhile, has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to challenge, obstruct, and even remove sitting presidents.

• The list is familiar: Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Pedro Castillo, and Dina Boluarte all became casualties of a system that increasingly resembles a parliamentary regime without parliamentary institutions.

• A Fujimori presidency would begin with advantages Sánchez likely would not enjoy. She possesses a more established political organization, stronger ties to the business community, and greater experience navigating Peru's institutions. Yet those advantages should not be overstated.

• The same fragmented Congress that undermined previous administrations will remain in place. The same territorial divisions will persist. And the same anti-fujimorista coalition that nearly defeated her again will continue to exist.

Yes, but. Declaring the race over would still be premature. The margin remains extraordinarily narrow, legal challenges are ongoing, and Sánchez's coalition has shown no indication that it intends to concede quietly. Peru has experienced enough contested elections over the past decade to know that political battles rarely end when voting concludes.

• Even if Fujimori's lead survives the final count, the deeper story of this election will not be her victory.

• It will be the persistence of a political system that continues to produce razor-thin outcomes, divided electorates, and governments that struggle to convert electoral wins into effective governance.

• In that sense, Peru may have chosen its next president. The question of whether that president will be able to govern is still very much unresolved. And the Phantom Menace—that of Sánchez—will still be around for the next election.

The World Cup is becoming a census of the Americas.

In perspective. At first glance, this looks like a football statistic. In reality, it is a demographic map disguised as a World Cup infographic. Among the 12 American national teams participating in the 2026 World Cup, 71 players were born outside the country they represent. That amounts to 22% of all players from the continent. More strikingly, nearly 78% of those foreign-born players were born outside the Americas altogether, overwhelmingly in Europe.

• The immediate temptation is to see this as evidence of globalization. It is. But it is also evidence of something more specific: the enduring power of migration networks across the Atlantic.

• It is, to some extent, a direct payoff of colonial rule, especially in the Caribbean.

Between the lines. The clearest example is Curaçao. Of its 26-man squad, virtually the entire team was born in the Netherlands. A country of fewer than 200,000 inhabitants is competing on the world stage not because of its domestic population, but because of a diaspora created by centuries of Dutch-Caribbean history. Haiti follows a similar pattern, drawing heavily from communities established in France, Canada, and the United States.

• Even larger countries such as Canada, the United States, Ecuador, Mexico, and Paraguay rely on players whose biographies span multiple continents.

Why it matters. Football is revealing a reality that is becoming increasingly important in geopolitics: countries are no longer defined solely by the people who live within their borders. They are increasingly shaped by the people who live beyond them. Diasporas are becoming strategic assets. They generate remittances, investment, political influence, cultural projection, and, in this case, sporting talent. A player born in London may represent Canada. A footballer raised in Germany may play for the United States. Someone born in Italy may wear the Argentine shirt.

• These are not exceptions. They are the product of demographic systems that have been operating for generations.

• The distribution is also telling. Only three players in the entire sample were born in Africa. Sixteen were born elsewhere in the Americas. Fifty-five were born on another continent, primarily Europe.

• The implication is that the Americas remain deeply connected to Europe through migration patterns that continue to shape national identities long after the original migrants arrived.

In conclusion. Viewed this way, the World Cup becomes something more than a sporting event. It has become, effectively, a census of globalization. Every foreign-born player represents a story of migration, dual identity, and demographic change. Every roster reflects historical relationships between countries and continents.

• Football may still be organized around flags and national anthems, but the composition of these squads suggests something deeper.

• The nations of the Americas are no longer defined only by territory. Increasingly, they are defined by networks of people stretching across oceans.

• The World Cup has, therefore, become a new piece of evidence of a world where cultures will continue to blur and change, shaping new national identities and political landscapes that will reshape the West.

The global fertilizer market is facing severe disruptions following the recent Hormuz crisis, placing particular pressure on major agricultural exporters. While the United States remains relatively insulated from the immediate shock, Brazil enters a period of acute vulnerability just as its spring planting season approaches. The divergence highlights a structural reality often overlooked in agricultural analysis: not all farming systems are equally dependent on global input markets.

• As fertilizer prices surge, what began as a supply-chain disruption is rapidly evolving into a broader macroeconomic and political challenge for Latin America’s largest economy.

In perspective. The resilience of an agricultural economy is closely tied to the characteristics of its soil. The 2026 fertilizer shock has exposed this distinction with unusual clarity. Much of American agriculture benefits from soils that naturally retain nutrients over multiple growing cycles, creating what some agronomists describe as a large “nutrient bank.” Brazil faces a different reality. Large portions of its tropical agricultural frontier have low nutrient retention, forcing producers into a constant cycle of fertilizer application to sustain yields. As a result, Brazilian agriculture remains heavily exposed to international disruptions in fertilizer markets.

• The Hormuz crisis has complicated global fertilizer supply chains, pushing up prices for key inputs across the agricultural sector.

• Brazil’s vulnerability is amplified by seasonality, as producers must secure inputs ahead of the September planting cycle regardless of market conditions.

• The United States enters the crisis in a stronger position, supported by domestic natural gas and phosphate production and a more secure supply chain.

Structure of capital. Brazil’s agricultural expansion over the past two decades has been built on a highly financialized model. Large producers increasingly shifted from subsidized public credit toward private capital markets, using leverage to finance land expansion, machinery purchases, and future production. This model performs well during periods of low-interest rates and stable commodity prices, but becomes considerably more fragile when financing costs rise and input prices spike simultaneously.

• Fertilizer benchmarks such as urea and potash are priced in dollars, exposing producers to exchange-rate volatility when the real weakens.

• Many firms have used future harvests as collateral, tightening financial conditions as production costs rise.

• Growing financial stress in states such as Mato Grosso and Goiás has already contributed to a rise in judicial restructuring proceedings and concerns about credit rationing.

Between the lines. The fertilizer shock is increasingly spilling into Brazil’s domestic political arena. Higher production costs are beginning to filter into food prices, particularly for staples and animal proteins. This creates a difficult environment for President Lula, whose political coalition depends heavily on lower-income urban and Northeastern voters who are especially sensitive to food inflation.

• Emergency debt-relief and refinancing programs have struggled to offset the speed of rising costs across the agricultural sector.

• Opposition figures are likely to frame the crisis as evidence of broader economic mismanagement and push for deregulation measures aimed at reducing production costs.

• Rising food inflation poses a direct political risk to the government, as increases in grocery prices have historically been among the most politically damaging forms of inflation.

In conclusion. The 2026 fertilizer crisis demonstrates the risks of an agricultural model heavily dependent on imported inputs and external financing. While the United States can rely on a combination of domestic production and more resilient soil systems, Brazil remains highly exposed to disruptions in global commodity and shipping markets. The convergence of elevated interest rates, tighter credit conditions, and rising food prices is likely to shape both economic performance and political debate over the coming year.

• Ultimately, the crisis serves as a reminder that soil chemistry, global logistics, and financial markets are far more interconnected than they often appear.