Is War Approaching?

Dear all,

We welcome you to the Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM).

This week feels like one of those quiet moments in geopolitics that probably won’t stay quiet for long.

In the Middle East, U.S. tankers and carriers are moving into position as tensions with Iran tighten and deadlines begin to feel real. In Central America, Nicaragua’s ruling couple continues to rule through repression and calculation—cooperating just enough with Washington to stay off the front page, but not necessarily out of danger. And down in Peru, the region’s most persistent political circus keeps spinning, a reminder that instability in Latin America doesn’t always explode; sometimes it just lingers.

Different theaters. Same underlying question: who is actually safe, and for how long?

In this issue, you will find:

• Are the Ortegas Going to Evade Trump’s Wrath?

• America Is Preparing for Something Big in the Middle East

• State-(un)building: Peruvian political crisis

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For years, Nicaragua has perfected a quiet survival strategy, which, so far, has escaped Trump 2.0's deadly hammer. 

In perspective. While Cuba absorbs the humanitarian spotlight and Venezuela draws the full weight of U.S. enforcement, Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo have operated in a gray zone: repressive, aligned with Washington’s adversaries, yet oddly spared from sustained American escalation. The question now is whether that insulation is durable.

• Nicaragua has so far dodged the fate of Cuba and Venezuela, despite becoming a fully consolidated family socialist autocracy.

• The regime has hollowed out institutions, elevated Murillo to co-president status, dismantled civil society, and tightened control over the army and police.

• Hundreds of thousands have fled, and remittances account for roughly 30% of the GDP. The state survives on narrow foundations and fear.

How it works. Yet Washington has not made Managua a priority. Nicaragua is a dictatorship that Trump appears willing to ignore—at least for now—largely because it does not disrupt U.S. material interests in the way Venezuela, Cuba, or Mexico do. It has no oil Washington covets, it is not a major electoral flashpoint inside the United States, and crucially, it appears to be cooperating just enough on counter-narcotics. 

• The Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine prioritizes hemispheric security above ideological confrontation. Migration routes, drug flows, and transnational criminal corridors matter more than rhetorical anti-imperialism.

• Nicaragua, while authoritarian, is not currently the hemisphere’s primary trafficking hub. Unlike Mexico or Venezuela, it is not the visible epicenter of cartel geopolitics. In fact, Managua has reportedly tightened migration policies and signaled cooperation in limiting drug transit.

• The regime understands the hierarchy of U.S. concerns. It does not need to be democratic. It only needs to avoid becoming a direct hemispheric threat.

Between the lines. Strategically, Nicaragua sits in a sensitive corridor. It bridges the Caribbean and Pacific coasts. It has historically hosted Russian security cooperation and expanded Chinese economic ties. Gold concessions increasingly tilt toward Beijing. In a tightening Western Hemisphere doctrine, such alignments cannot remain invisible indefinitely. More importantly, the Maduro precedent changed the calculus completely.

• Washington demonstrated that regime change pressure can be selective and transactional. Maduro was removed, yet parts of his structure were left intact.

• Insiders in Managua now understand there may be “political life” for regime figures after the first family exits. That message introduces fracture risk within the Nicaraguan elite.

• Daniel Ortega is 80 and Murillo, 74. Succession is not so challenging to imagine; it seems imminent.

Why it matters. Unlike Ortega, Murillo lacks revolutionary credentials and is widely viewed as polarizing, even within the regime’s core. If Washington increases pressure (financial, trade, or sanction-based), segments of the political and military apparatus could reassess loyalty calculations. Authoritarian durability often depends less on repression than on elite cohesion. Succession moments test that cohesion.

• So are the Ortegas evading Trump’s wrath? Yes—tactically. They have avoided provoking confrontation.

• They are not antagonizing Trump personally. They are not openly undermining U.S. border enforcement priorities. They do not present an oil-rich prize. They do not dominate American domestic politics.

• They have not called Trump's attention like Maduro, Díaz Canel, or even Sheinbaum and Petro, but structurally, their position is fragile.

Yes, but. Nicaragua’s economy is dependent on U.S. remittances and trade access: It remains inside CAFTA. The United States could escalate tariffs gradually or target financial channels. Unlike Cuba, Nicaragua’s private sector has not been fully isolated from Western markets. The regime’s survival formula has always relied on repression at home and strategic irrelevance abroad. The first is intact, but the second is eroding.

• Under a hemispheric doctrine centered on denying adversaries space in the Western Hemisphere, Nicaragua’s growing ties to China and Russia could become intolerable if Washington shifts to comprehensive enforcement.

• And if migration flows spike or drug routes shift through Nicaraguan territory, Managua would instantly move up the priority ladder.

The bottom line. The Ortegas are not safe, but they remain temporarily below the threshold. Their strategy appears to rely on conceding just enough on narcotics and migration to avoid becoming a headline target. That can work in the short term, but it does not solve the long-term problem of leadership aging, economic narrowness, and elite uncertainty after the Maduro example.

• They are not immune, but they are managing time, after all, they just need to survive a four-year term and hope the next president is not as harsh as Trump.

The U.S. is engaged in one of the most significant military buildups in the Middle East since the Iraq War to pressure Iran over its nuclear program and missile development. This deployment includes:

In perspective. The situation was largely spotted by independent users on X, who, on Monday, started monitoring the massive movement of U.S. tankers to the Mediterranean. It later escalated to a widespread discussion of whether the U.S. was planning a military offense as a credible threat during the ongoing negotiations with Iran this week. A large naval force, anchored by at least one aircraft carrier strike group, is already operating in the Arabian Sea, and a second carrier—USS Gerald R. Ford—is en route to join it, and it was spotted passing through the Strait of Gibraltar just yesterday. 

• The deployment also includes tankers and aerial refueling aircraft (e.g., KC-135s) repositioned from bases in Europe and the U.S. toward the Middle East region to support long-range operations and sustain aircraft on alert.

• Heavy military cargo planes are also moving equipment and supplies into the region, along with fighter jets and support assets staged in nearby bases—such as F-15s positioned in Jordan—to provide flexible strike and defensive options.  

How it works. These movements aren’t routine rotations but clearly part of a sustained positioning of power that enhances the U.S. capacity for extended operations. Strategically, the large number of tankers and refueling aircraft is notable because they are a backbone of sustained air operations. Without sufficient aerial refueling capacity, long-range sorties into Iran, missile-defense patrols, and rapid reinforcements would be constrained. 

• The sheer scale of refueling support being repositioned suggests contingency planning for scenarios that go beyond mere deterrence.  

Tehran reacts. Iran has clearly responded to the U.S. buildup with its posture changes. The regime temporarily closed the strategic Strait of Hormuz for missile drills, a move that would have major global energy repercussions if repeated during real conflict. Iranian leadership has publicly warned that it would defend itself “like never before” if attacked, including hints at disrupting shipping through Hormuz or threatening naval assets.  

• Iran continues military exercises, reinforcing facilities and spreading defenses to decrease vulnerability to strikes.

• Tehran also remains deeply resistant to U.S. demands to curtail its nuclear program and ballistic missile development, forcing talks into a tenuous space with no clear path to a diplomatic resolution.

• This threat, however, has very low credibility to Trump, who carried out Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 with no substantial consequence.

Between the lines. Despite the military buildup, Washington has not yet launched any strikes. President Trump has been reported to set a rough 10–15 day deadline for Tehran to accept the terms on its nuclear agenda before possible limited strikes occur. At the same time, indirect talks in Geneva continue, with Iranian officials drafting counterproposals even as they resist key U.S. conditions. Diplomacy and coercion are unfolding in parallel, a pattern consistent with the Trump administration’s approach in other theaters.

• This military posture has broader implications. Allies in Europe are adjusting their plans—U.S. fighter jets were pulled from a NATO exercise in Norway to be repositioned for potential action near Iran due to rising tensions.

• Russia has publicly urged restraint while conducting cooperative activities with Iranian forces, indicating strategic alignment without a binding defense pact, once again, deterrence with almost no effect for Trump.

• Oil markets, meanwhile, remain on edge. Moves like the Hormuz drills—even temporarily closing the strait—underscore how military escalation could quickly impact energy flows.  

The bottom line. The deployment of U.S. tankers and other logistical support into the Middle East is preparatory positioning ahead of a potential diplomatic rupture or military contingency. Many expect the U.S. to strike any time during the weekend—perhaps even while this newsletter is being sent—but it would not seem strategically coherent with Trump's negotiating strategy.

• According to our read on the situation, this buildup is a clear deterrence strategy, but we would not rule out Trump dismissing Iran's Hormuz threat and proceeding with an offensive if his demands are not met.

• With both sides entrenched and deadlines looming, the situation remains one of the most acute flashpoints in global geopolitics since Iraq.

Peru's political landscape has descended into a state of relentless turmoil, marked by the rapid succession of presidents. While democratic backsliding usually involves power concentrating in the hands of a strongman, the Peruvian system is collapsing from the exact opposite phenomenon. The nation's democracy is perishing due to an extreme dilution of power that leaves state institutions unworkable.

• From a failed self-coup to violent protests met with brutal repression, the country has become a cautionary tale of what happens when a democracy operates without professional politicians.

In perspective. The sheer velocity of Peru's executive turnover reveals a political structure that has effectively lost control of the perverse incentive electoral engineering system Peru has experienced relentless political turmoil and democratic decay, cycling through seven different presidents during the last seven years. 

• This extreme volatility is driven by constant conflict between the executive and legislative branches, resulting in multiple impeachment attempts and fleeting administrations.

• Since the election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990, Peruvian voters have consistently turned to political outsiders to solve deep-rooted structural problems like poor public-goods provision and weak rule of law. Figures like Toledo, Humala, and Pedro Castillo have all come to power as outsiders, revealing a problematic political system that does not respond to societal demands.

• As institutions continuously fail to resolve these high-stakes disputes, the armed forces have been gradually drawn back into the political process, acting as a gate of containment of political turmoil.

How it works. The Constitution and recent electoral reforms have engineered a system that destroys political careers and sparks inter-branch conflict. The traditional party system has collapsed into extreme electoral fragmentation, turning politicians into transient individual entrepreneurs. Rather than relying on established organizations, candidates frequently utilize small electoral machines managed by hired operatives to secure a quick victory.

• Driven by public frustration, a 2018 referendum made the immediate reelection of congresspeople completely illegal.

• Now, only political amateurs arrive to Congress, who lack a verifiable political past and, thus, operate with incredibly weak accountability and no long-term incentives.

• The electoral reforms have endowed the legislature with the capacity to declare the presidency vacant due to “physical or moral incapacity” and the presidency to dissolve Congress if lawmakers refuse a vote of confidence to two consecutive cabinets, igniting a constant struggle for quotas between both powers.

Between the lines. The extreme dilution of power has restructured political incentives, rewarding radicalism and short-term predation over stable governance. Because reelection is illegal and party loyalty is practically nonexistent, politicians operate under a dangerous "take your one shot, and take it now" mentality. With no political future to protect, these amateurs focus exclusively on maximizing their immediate power, influence, and personal gains while in office.

• Politicians lack meaningful, programmatic links to society, meaning there is no organized base to hold them accountable. Instead, they rely heavily on volatile anti-vote mechanisms—such as anti-fujimorismo or anti-left positioning—which successfully mobilize voters during campaigns but provide zero foundation for an actual governing agenda.

• This hollowing leaves elected officials utterly incapable of aggregating societal demands or negotiating resolutions to crises.

• Consequently, when faced with opposition or protests, desperate and overwhelmed governments default to predating public resources or using severe state repression, effectively replacing democratic politics with brute force.

In conclusion. Peru serves as a stark warning of what happens when a nation effectively eliminates professional politicians and political parties, leaving a hollowed-out system that defaults to unaccountable force. The fundamental question is no longer what kind of government citizens want, but whether the country can be governed at all.